An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan (1931-1945) Read online

  The term ‘elder statesmen’ referred to the remaining number of those who had drawn up the Meiji Constitution who survived after the Russo-Japanese War. Even though they were ageing and senile, some of them tried to pass on to their successors a sense of crisis they had experienced at the close of the Tokugawa period, and an understanding of the esoteric cult of the national religion, so that they would be in a position to manipulate its believers. The last of the elder statesmen was Prince Saionji Kinmochi, who died in 1940. His expectations in this regard were not fulfilled by Prince Konoye Fumimaro in whom he had envisaged the continuation of his own role in Japanese politics.24

  This group of elder statesmen, who could communicate directly with the Emperor without occupying any official position responsible to the Parliament or the bureaucracy, provided a screen for the conflict of opinions on the most important decisions. It lost its power with the rise of the young military officers, who exerted pressure upon the Emperor through the prerogative of the supreme command, and the elder statesmen screen did not function from 1931 to 1945. However, towards the close of the war, in 1945, a group of the semi-elder statesmen - not the original architects of the Meiji state but slightly younger men who had grown up in the era of the Restoration and in the atmosphere of crisis of this period - formed amorphous groups independent of their formal positions. Through informal communication among themselves, they engineered the replacement of the leader of the military machine with an older, retired military man who would listen to the advice of the old. The last Prime Minister of the war period, Suzuki Kantarō (1867-1948), had been the commander of a torpedo boat fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, had later served as Grand Chamberlain to the Emperor, and was shot at by an army officer in the uprising of 26 February 1936 because he was an obstacle to military dictatorship. He was appointed Prime Minister in April 1945 and brought the country to accept surrender. At first he had proclaimed that he would work for the preservation of the national structure, hinting to the general populace that the war would be fought to the last, but at the same time intimating to the few working with him that Japan would be preserved without fighting to the last. On the very day he accepted the Potsdam Declaration, he declared through the newspapers that the national structure had been preserved. In his dealings with both the general populace and his peers we see his masterly understanding of both the esoteric and exoteric national cults.

  The political ideology developed by the Meiji Government was systematically inculcated in the minds of the people. The criteria for value judgements were the Imperial Rescripts issued by the Emperor. Imperial Rescripts had been promulgated by successive emperors since the legendary period. After the Meiji Restoration, the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors and the Rescript on Education were the two most important, but there were also edicts issued at the beginning and end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War and the Pacific War. The series ends with the Emperor's Humanity Declaration - the declaration that he was human - promulgated on 1 January, 1946, which was drawn up at the instigation of the Occupation Authorities.

  The key words of these edicts became the words by which Japanese people could defend their moral and political positions. The skilful manipulation of these key words served as a sort of identity card for loyal subjects of the Emperor. Their use was inculcated in the minds of all citizens during the six years of compulsory education in primary school, and in the case of males in their further two years of compulsory training as soldiers. The Education Rescript was read aloud by the principal on all important national holidays, when pupils were expected to come to school at least for the ceremony and to listen to the edicts, standing with their heads bent low, an ordeal for children with frail constitutions. In the Army, the recruits were expected to be able to recite the whole of the long text of the Emperor's words to the soldiers, which was an intellectual feat. Many children and soldiers were flogged for their inability to write the characters properly and to recite smoothly. Together with the reading and reciting of the edicts there was the ritual of paying homage to the Emperor's photograph which was kept in a special storehouse in each primary school. Pupils and teachers were expected to make respectful bows when passing by the storehouse. The Emperor was thus the source of religious, moral, and political authority until the end of the war.

  Because of this process of conditioning, the key words of the edicts, previously uncommon in everyday speech, came to be used unconsciously in normal conversation and writing and especially in the talks given by leaders of local societies, government officials, or by non-commissioned officers to their men. Their use, moreover, conformed to a certain pattern set by the edicts, so that the sentences which contained these words tended to reflect a particular school of thought. Because of the power of these catchwords, such sentences would be accepted as valid without consideration in the light of actual experience.

  I do not believe this to be a phenomenon unique to modern Japan. Such political practices must be typical of theocracies. It is important to note the theocratic aspect of the post-Meiji Government as well as its democratic aspect, and to see how they were interwoven. The theocratic aspect came to the fore with the impact of the world panic after 1929 and after Japan's invasion of China in 1931. Then Japan could be manipulated as a united society trained in a system of conditioned reflexes by nearly eighty years of compulsory government education and conscription.

  According to Maruyama Masao, participants in Japanese politics may be divided into three categories: (1) the portable shrine,* (2) the official, and (3) the outlaw.25 The portable shrine represents authority, the official represents power, and the outlaw represents violence. The Meiji Government from the outset gave the appearance of authority to the Emperor but the real decisionmaking power to officials, who were drawn from among the people by a relatively fair competitive examination system. The power of higher officials is still considerable. It is said that each of the Japanese ministries today is, in reality, subdivided into mini-ministries headed by powerful section chiefs. In this system the decisions of officials are questioned by people without status through pressure groups whose spokesmen are outlaws.

  When the Meiji order began to fail, the growing discontent of the people was expressed by the outlaws, who forced the officials to follow a literal interpretation of the political ideology of the Meiji state. According to this interpretation, all religious, moral, and political values resided in the Emperor as successor to the unbroken line of emperors of heavenly descent. Therefore, ideas imported from the West - democracy and the materialistic interpretation of the world and man - should be entirely abolished. Language that had been used rhetorically by the higher officials was now to be interpreted seriously as firm fact and the basis for action.

  The ideological leader Minoda Kyōki, Professor of Logic and Psychology at Keiō, a major private university, wrote in 1933, ‘the Japanese nation, which preserves the myth of the national foundation and the national religion through its faith in the living god who is the present Emperor, will realize the destiny of humanity entrusted to man by world history, which Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and socialism have failed to achieve. When we faithfully serve our Emperor as a living god and defend our home country, we serve humanity’. Minoda's argument was that the Japanese could only serve humanity by making Japan the strongest country in the world. This argument gained great popularity, and brought about the expulsion of liberal professors from the Law Department of Kyoto Imperial University, the second in the educational hierarchy, changing the character of the department. Minoda then directed his attacks against Tokyo Imperial University, at the apex of the hierarchy, and brought about the downfall of Professor Minobe's Organ Theory of the Emperor. Minobe was summoned by the public prosecutor in 1935 and was asked whether a Japanese might, under existing law, criticize an Imperial Rescript. The public prosecutor, Togawa, had studied law under Minobe when he was a student at Tokyo Imperial University and had gained admission to the
bar through his studies of the Organ Theory of the Constitution, and so he was well versed in the details of his teacher's theory. The day after the trial Minobe's three books on the Constitution were banned. Minobe did not retract his theory but he resigned his membership in the House of Peers in the same year.

  What was the opinion of the Emperor, the portable shrine, about the esoteric and exoteric cults? General Honjō Shigeru (1876-1945), chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor at the time, recorded in his diary a dialogue with the Emperor.27 When General Honjō tried to communicate the view of the Army, the Emperor commented: If we try to suppress science by ideology or faith, the progress of the world will come to a standstill. The evolution theory, for instance, will be undermined. However, ideology and faith are not unnecessary. Ideology and science should develop on parallel lines.’

  When the people, led by outlaws, demanded that the Government follow a literal interpretation of the national myth, the majority of the officials in power did not dare to refuse openly. The Emperor himself, in spite of the private conversation recorded in General Honjō’s diary, did not say publicly that he disapproved of this new policy. On the contrary, he was influenced by the development of the war against China, and he did not support those politicians who sought to put a stop to it by evacuating the expeditionary forces.28

  From the early Meiji period, the Japanese bureaucracy had favoured a policy of giving key positions to competent young men, and the military administration was no exception. In the years following 1931 this policy was, at least superficially, preserved: at the General Headquarters both of the Army and the Navy, young officers had the duty of supplying the latest information on the resources of Japan and its potential adversaries. In effect, the war period brought the esoteric and exoteric cults into conflict. Two of the young officers who, in accordance with Meiji tradition, were given the important duty of supplying the latest information on the resources of Japan and its potential enemies, Major Hayashi Saburō of the Army and Lieutenant Commander Takahashi Hajime of the Navy, have informed me that when asked whether Japan had any prospect of prevailing in a war against the United States and Britain they had always replied ‘No’.29

  The Pacific War was begun in spite of such warnings. The reason generally given was the impending shortage of oil, and that the longer the beginning of the war was delayed, the worse Japan's position would become. The underlying reason was the ten-year-old movement in favour of total military mobilization, a movement which could not now be stopped without damage to the machinery of government. The leaders who had been supplying the nation for so long with false information on the relative military strength of Japan and its would-be enemies and on Japan's military and economic position finally fell victim to self-deception. In deceiving the people, they deceived themselves. I believe this to have been the fundamental cause of the outbreak of the Pacific War. The exoteric national cult had in the end overwhelmed the esoteric cult, and the original design of the Meiji architects collapsed.

  The rightists began to assassinate liberal statesmen and businessmen, and also made several abortive attempts at a coup d'etat which involved outlaws and military officers. The Manchurian Incident was launched by some staff officers of the expeditionary forces in China, and the Government backed this unexpected move on the part of the troops it had dispatched. This resulted in the establishment of Manchukuo and continuing warfare with China. It was because of their inability to bring this war to a close that the Japanese were drawn into the quagmire of the Pacific War. In sum, Japan lost the war against China, a fact most Japanese people are not prepared to admit even today.

  In order to continue the unpopular, undeclared warfare with China in spite of pressure from Britain and the United States, the Government initiated emergency measures for the unification of popular opinion. The Government put the concept of national structure to a new, more literal use, making two separate declarations for its clarification. Thus the officials succumbed to the rightist outlaws who worked in combination with military officers. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized to unify all Japanese people in all walks of life in collaboration with the already fixed Government policy of continuing the undeclared war to the end. This brought Japan into conflict with the United States, Britain, and Holland, and finally the Government declared war on the United States and Britain. The parliamentary system was continued, but the political parties dissolved of their own accord to join the one Government-sponsored party. In 1942, the so-called Imperial Rule Assistance Election was held. It was not a free election, but was controlled by violence on the part of the police and the rightists. Three hundred and eighty-one candidates who had been recommended by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association were elected, although eighty-five candidates not recommended by the organization were also elected, revealing that at this time some voices were still raised against the Government's conduct of the war and control of public opinion.

  A drawing by Sugiura Sachio was published in the May 1942 issue of the magazine Cartoon, with the caption ‘Purge the United States and Britain from your Head’. The cartoon depicts a young girl scratching her head, and imported ideas falling off like dandruff. At that time there was a campaign against wavy hair by the rightist movement, and curling one's hair with electrical curlers was thought to be anti-national and against the national structure. This was the culmination of the campaign for tenkō begun by the Government in 1931.

  What remained after the shedding of imported ideas? At the time of the publication of Sugiura's cartoon, the ideas inculcated by the Government remained: the ideas of national structure and the infallibility of the Emperor as the living god. But after the defeat, and after the Emperor's proclamation that he was only a human being, the idea of national structure also fell off like another layer of dandruff. Then all that finally remained was the body. This was the basis of what was called ‘bodyism’, rampant in the period after the war and persisting in varied forms to this day. To be true to the needs of the body was proclaimed the supreme aim in the post-war literature of Sakaguchi Ango, Tamura Taijirō and Tanaka Hidemitsu, the last of whom I will discuss later. The ‘economic animalism’ that emerged after the 1960s may have grown from these seeds sown in wartime. However, the conditioned reflex of many years is still stored as a subconscious memory of the culture of the past. The essence of the concept of national structure still exists, although the words are no longer used. Thus we return to the trait of insularity, modified by the conditions of the post-war period. In contrast to the Tokugawa period, when the great majority of Japanese were farmers, insularity is hardly appropriate to contemporary Japan, where farmers make up only one-tenth of the population. Nevertheless, the conditions for insular culture still exist: the Japanese still live on islands surrounded by sea, with no land borders to fear for, all speak the same language and live under conditions of great population density in a group of narrow islands, and the trait of insularity is therefore not easily erased. So the question we must ask is, What form does the national structure take today?

  ____________

  * Kokutai means literally, ‘the national body’.

  * The portable shrine, or o-mikoshi, is carried through the streets on festival days on the shoulders of a large group of men.

  5 Greater Asia

  ‘Greater Asia’ was a term expressive of Japanese solidarity with the other peoples of the Asiatic continent. It signified an ideal and harmonious great community of all the peoples of Asia, including the Japanese. We find rudiments of such a feeling of solidarity in the sense of crisis felt by the precursors of the Meiji Restoration at the time of the Opium War. After the Meiji Restoration, however, many, like Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), in spite of their concern with Korea and China, abandoned the preoccupation with problems of Asia and chose to concentrate their entire energy on learning about the institutions of Europe. When they turned to Korea and China, they assumed the role of representatives of ‘civilization’, entitled to force upon these cou
ntries their own newly acquired Western ways.

  Because the invasion of China was an unexpected development, initiated in 1931 by Japan's expeditionary forces in north China, the central Government, although supporting the military's move, could devise only ad hoc explanations, justifying events as they occurred. The first to publish a general justification were nongovernment rightist ideologues, who worked closely with the younger military officers who were in charge of the operation. It was only nine years after the Manchurian Incident took place, when the whole series of events was a fait accompli, that the Government was able to present an ideological rationale. This took the form of a proclamation by Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880-1946), then Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Konoye Cabinet, on 2 August 1940.31

  Our present policy will aim at establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, linking Japan, Manchuria, and China, based on the great spirit of the Imperial Way. ... It is natural to include French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

  The range of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had been determined by military necessity. There had been a series of position papers drawn up by the staff officers of the Navy and the Army, in cooperation with scholars, to defend the gains made by the military after 1931. The fountainhead of all these strategic experiments was the idea of an East Asian federation. This notion was conceived by Ishiwara Kanji (1889-1949), one of the staff officers of the expeditionary force responsible for the military action during and after the Manchurian Incident. Ishiwara believed that Japan would ultimately come into conflict with the imperialist powers of the West, including the Soviet Union, and, therefore, should avoid protracted war with China (although he himself was partly responsible for its initiation). His solution was to form an equal and friendly federation of Japan, China, and Manchukuo. Ishiwara was one of the chief architects of Man-chukuo, but was expelled and excluded from all important positions in the Army when Tōjō came into power there and gained control of the Army and the central Government, because Ishiwara's ideas seemed seditious to Tōjō.